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Picketing the Homes of Public Officials
Although picketing has in the past been most frequently associated with
labor disputes, it has served also to forward significant non-labor goals'
-most notably, those of civil rights advocates.2 In recent years, a varia-
tion on such "public issue" picketing has become increasingly prevalent;
aggrieved citizens have moved their picket lines from government
buildings to the private residences of public officials.3 Condemning
this activity, one commentator has recently written:
1 See generally Annot., Nonlabor Picketing or Boycott, 93 A.L.R.2d 1284 (1964). See also
cases collected in Note, Non-Labor Picketing and the Thornhill Case, 41 CoLumn. L. REv.
89 (1941).
2 See, e.g., NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd for
mootness, 376 U.S. 190 (1964); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Young Adults
for Progressive Action v. B. & B. Cash Grocery Stores, 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. D. Ct. App.
1963), appeal dismissed, 157 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1963); Fair Share Organization v. Mitnick, 134
Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963), transfer denied, 244 Ind. 117, 191 N.E.2d 100 (1963);
Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Ad. 109 (1935); Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171
Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1939); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.
Supp. 946 (1934); Sumter v. Lewis, 241 S.C. 364, 128 S.E.2d 684 (1962); Tallahassee Theatres
v. Due, 8 RAcE REL. REP. 636 (1963).
3 See, e.g., Flores v. City and County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950)
(disturbing the peace conviction reversed); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct.
N.Y.C. 1941) (disorderly conduct conviction affirmed); Fawick Airflex v. Electrical Workers,
56 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 92 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio App. 1950), appeal dismissed for lack of debat-
able constitutional question, 154 Ohio St. 205, 93 N.E.2d 769 (1950) (contempt conviction of
picketers of a judge's home). The home of Mayor Daley, in Chicago, has been picketed on
several occasions: pickets protesting lack of action on school integration, Chicago Sun-
Times, August 15, 1963, p. 42, cols. 1-6; pickets protesting the rehiring of the superinten-
dent of schools, Chicago Tribune, August 2, 1965, § 1, p. 8, col. 4; August 3, 1965, § 1, p. 1,
col. 1, p. 10, cols. 3-5; August 4, 1965, § 1, p. 1, col. 3, p. 2, cols. 4-6; see also Wille, Mayor
Daley Meets the Movement, The Nation, August 30, 1965, p. 92; pickets protesting de-
struction of trees for road project, Chicago Daily News, Sept. 23, 1965, p. 4, col. 6; civil
rights picketers, Chicago Daily News, August 4, 1966, p. 3, cols. 3-7.
The homes of school board members in Chicago have been picketed. Chicago Sun-Times,
August 15, 1963, p. 42, cols. 1-6. One school board president resigned after picketing of his
home and sit-ins at his office. Chicago Sun-Times, August 17, 1963, p. 14, cols. 1-4, at col. 3.
Pickets demanding the resignation of superintendent of schools Willis marched at his
skyscraper apartment building. Chicago Sun-Times, August 16, 1963, p. 3, cols. 1-2, p. 26,
cols. 2-6.
In San Francisco, Viet Nam war protestors picketed Governor Brown's residence. Life,
Dec. 10, 1965, p. 114. Senator Dirksen's home in Pekin, Ill., was picketed by 550 union
members protesting the Senator's filibuster against repeal of § 14-B of the Taft-Hartley
Act. Chicago Sunday Sun-Times, Feb. 2, 1966, p. 4, cois. 1-4. The home of the Jackson,
Michigan, mayor has been picketed. Chicago Daily News, Sept. 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 7, p. 4,
cob. 7.
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In the constitutional value scale, the quiet enjoyment and
privacy of residential premises-even of the privately-owned
homes of public officials-merits a higher priority than free-
dom of speech. A state or a municipality encounters no con-
stitutional obstacle in drastically regulating picketing, whether
labor or political, in residential areas, or even in prohibiting
such activities.4
Judicial authority, however, is not so clear-cut. Of four courts which
have confronted picketing of public officials' homes, 5 three have con-
fined themselves to distinguishable fact situations in ruling against the
picketers.6 The fourth has ruled in favor of their activity, stating:
The noise involved was incidental to a legitimate right,
protected by the Constitution, to appeal to those in authority
for redress of grievances by remonstrance, and such right must
In Milwaukee, the home of the chairman of the school board was picketed. Chicago
Daily News, Oct. 20, 1965, p. 40, cols. 3-8, at col. 8. The home of an alderman was also
picketed in Milwaukee. Milwaukee Journal, June 9, 1966, § 2, p. 1, cols. 6-9. A Milwaukee
judge's home was picketed by civil rights workers following his refusal to resign from
the segregated Eagles Club. Chicago Sun-Times, August 21, 1966, p. 42, col. 3; Time,
Sept. 9, 1966, pp. 23-24.
In New York the home of a police officer was picketed by persons protesting his shooting
of a Negro youth. Life, Dec. 3, 1965, pp. 90, 115. Grade Mansion, residence of the mayor
of New York City, has been picketed. Sunday New York Times, Oct. 11, 1964, § 1, p. 80,
cols. 2-3. The White House is regularly picketed; judicial note was taken of this practice
in Scott v. District of Columbia, 184 A.2d 849, 851 (1962).
In Milwaukee the residence of the Catholic archbishop was picketed. Chicago Daily News,
Oct. 18, 1965, p. 1, cols. 5-8, p. 4, cols. 1-4. The home of the chairman of the board of
directors of a hospital was picketed by a union. Hebrew Homes v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d
173, 235 N.Y.S.2d 318 (S. Ct. 1962).
4 Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 177, 182-
83 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Kamin, Picketing).
5 Flores v. City and County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1951); Chicago v.
Gant, Chicago Mun. Ct. No. 585,798 (1965) (unreported); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487
(Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941); Fawick Airflex v. Electrical Workers, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 92
N.E.2d 446 (Ohio App.), appeal dismissed for lack of debatable constitutional question,
154 Ohio St. 205, 93 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
6 In People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941), the court affirmed a
disorderly conduct conviction on the basis of the dangers presented by the large crowd.
It specifically did not pass on the legality of other instances of residential picketing.
See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra. In Fawick, supra note 5, the defendants were
found guilty of contempt for picketing a judge's home. Safeguarding of the judicial
process is distinguishable as a special need. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 13A (1956). Moreover,
conviction for contempt is a remedy peculiar to the official here being picketed. Gant, supra
note 5, involved a conviction for disorderly conduct. See text accompanying notes 146 &e 152
infra. As in Levner, large crowds were involved. There was also a refusal to obey a police
order to disperse. Clearly, none of these decisions necessarily extends to three or four quiet
picketers parading before a non-judicial public official.
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be balanced against the right of the community to peace and
quiet.7
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether constitu-
tional protections are afforded residential picketing, whether any
restrictions may be placed on its practice, and if so, what form these
restrictions might take.8
THE FRA MEwoRK
Two lines of precedent press for consideration. State and federal
court decisions involving labor residential picketing would for the
most part urge prohibition of this activity.9 Similarly, Supreme Court
decisions on non-labor picketing indicate the possibility of proscrip-
tion.10 Neither line, however, is determinative. The labor cases cannot
be indiscriminately applied to an activity which arises in a non-labor
context. And the Supreme Court decisions, because they do not speak
to this activity, do not dispose of the problems it poses.
The Labor Cases
With one exception," the courts have refused to sanction residential
picketing in the course of labor disputes. However, their fealty in main-
taining this position has been less than unwavering. Certainly one of
the most emphatic denunciations of the practice was voiced in Pipe
Machinery Co. v. DeMore.12 Since the appellants had only been direct-
7 Flores v. City and County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 77-78, 220 P.2d 373, 376 (1950). While
picketing of a publicly owned residence may involve somewhat different considerations
than that of a privately owned one, since the taxpayer's money supports it, that distinction
is not present here. The following is the text of a letter from Phillip E. Jones, Senior
Analyst, Colorado General Assembly Legislative Council, to the University of Chicago Law
Review, July 11, 1966, on file in the Review office:
In 1949 and 1950, Colorado did not provide a state-owned home for its governor.
Consequently, Governor Knous was living in a private residence at the time to
which you refer.
Also, Colorado's governor receives a contingency fund appropriation of $10,000
annually which may be spent at the sole discretion of the governor. Governor
Knous could have used part of this fund for living expenses, but we do not know
whether he used it in this manner or not. In any event, Governor Knous did not
receive a specific appropriation for housing purposes in 1949 and 1950.
8 See generally Kamin, Picketing. For treatment of residential picketing under English
and Canadian law, see Winkler, Picketing of Private Homes: the Anomalous Peaceful
Picketing Clause, 20scoo E HALL L.J. 437 (1968).
9 The labor residential picketing cases will be discussed in subsequent textual and
footnote analysis. See generally cases collected in TEL.ER, LABOR Dispurrs AND CoLUEv
BARGAINING § 115 (1940).
10 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
555, 558 (1965).
11 Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908).
12 76 N.E.2d 725 (1947).
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ing epithets against the non-striking employees, and therefore had not
been conveying useful information about the strike, the court sus-
tained an injunction issued to restrain their picketing. Reasoning
further on broader grounds, the court made clear that it "did not
wish it to be implied that the picketing of residences under any cir-
cumstances should be approved."'' 3 The home is a "man's 'castle'" and
"his sanctuary," and residential picketing intrudes into its "quiet and
peaceful environment .... -"' Other courts, as well, have been firm in
their disapprobation. 5
This stance has not been universal. Thus, in United Electrical
Workers v. Baldwin,8 the district court was leery of allowing the
picketers' arrest for breach of the peace, recognizing the peaceful
character of their activity:
It was in every sense of the word peaceful, and there was no
use of force or threats .... There was no attempt to block
free ingress and egress from the homes, and no violence of
any kind.17
Without state court authority to define the term "breach of the peace,"
however, the court felt compelled to refuse to issue an injunction
restraining the picketers' arrest.'8 Other decisions have displayed an
ambivalence towards peaceful residential picketing, sustaining convic-
tions because of the associated violence. 19 A fairly old federal court
13 Id. at 727.
14 Ibid.
15 See, e.g., Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D.C. Hawaii 1947);
State y. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W.
302 (1936); State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930). In Petrucci v. Hogan,
5 Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941), the court enjoined residential picketing,
holding that since the plaintiff civil servants were government employees and as such
could not be coerced to join a union, the picketing was unlawful. In A. R. Barnes & Co. v.
Chicago Typographical Union, 232 I11. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908), the trial court issued an
injunction restraining the union, inter alia, from congregating about employees' homes or
calling upon them. The decree was affirmed, but the decision is of slight value since the
court felt that any picketing was illegal.
16 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946).
17 Id. at 242.
18 The court wanted to wait for a state court determination whether residential picket-
ing constituted a breach of the peace. No judicial determination was forthcoming, but in
the following year the legislature passed a law prohibiting the picketing of employees'
domiciles. CONN. GatN. STAT. ANN. § 31-120 (1960).
19 See, e.g., Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22
N.E.2d 320 (1939). The Busch Jewelry strike and litigation is thoroughly documented in
MARIANO, THE Busch JEWELRY STopxs LABOR INJUNCTON (1940). See also, Miller v. Galla-
gher, 28 N.Y.S.2d 606, 611-12 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Miller cannot be given too much weight, since
it relied on Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941), which first brought labor picketing
within the ambit of free speech. Since then, the Thornhill doctrine has been contracted. See
note 40 infra.
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decision, Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,20 clearly allowed
such activity. The court had before it an injunction which barred the
unions "from . . . picketing . . . the homes or boarding houses or
residences of the said complainant's employees . .. "21 This decree
was modified by adding after "picketing" the words "in a threaten-
ing manner. '22 Thus, the court acquiesced to peaceful residential
picketing.23
Were inconsistency of language the only criticism that could be
leveled against these labor decisions, one would be hard put to deny
the combined weight of their holdings. There is a more definitive
distinction at work here, however. Labor law is structured on an
ability to identify the disputants, to isolate the grievances, and to reach
agreements which render discernible changes in the pre-existing cir-
cumstances. Because of the relative definiteness and clarity of these
goals, a viable system can operate to police and to protect the collective
bargaining process. The consequence of this system is that prohibition
of an activity such as residential picketing does not endanger the parity
of the parties, since other well defined outlets of expression and action
are guaranteed.
Non-labor picketing operates in a different framework. The govern-
ment official represents a constituency whose desires are disparate and
often contrary; the protestors themselves often are only loosely
coalesced. Even if the disputants are distinct, their grievances are
intertwined with political and social problems which cannot be solved
by a carefully documented agreement, but only by a gradual process
of change. Such a congeries of amorphous variables precludes a complex
statutory scheme such as that erected to govern labor activity.24 Con-
sequently, prohibition of non-labor picketing cannot be tempered by
the guaranteed availability of other tactics.
Reliance, therefore, on the labor experience as a model for prohibi-
20 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908).
21 Id. at 47.
22 Id. at 52. But see criticism of the addition of these words, as applied to business,
rather than residential, picketing in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184, 207 (1921).
23 In Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron Workers, 186 Cal.
604, 200 Pac. 1 (1921), a permanent injunction was issued restraining the union, inter alia,
from going to the homes of employees to intimidate or threaten them. The appellate
court made only minor modifications in the decree. Thus, it might be argued, as it was
in the dissent in State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939), note 143 infra, that
this means that peaceful picketing is allowable. However, the court seemed to indicate
that it understood "intimidation" to encompass even peaceful picketing. See 186 Cal. at
608, 200 Pac. at 4.
24 Cf. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 28 (hereinafter cited as Kalven, The Public Forum).
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tion of non-labor residential picketing is bedeviled by a less than
harmonious group of precedents and a dissimilar structure of group
conflict on which to premise analogies. This, of course, is not to deny
the relevance of the labor experience, but rather to emphasize that
disapprobation of labor residential picketing does not necessarily com-
pel the same conclusion in the non-labor field.25
The Public Forum
The streets and parks have traditionally served the needs of public
discussion, as numerous Supreme Court decisions attest.26 Three recent
cases have dealt with non-labor picketing, but like the labor cases,
they are not dispositive of the issues surrounding residential picketing.
Edwards v. South Carolina27 and the two Cox decisions28 are separated
by only two years, yet their language suggests a shift in the Court's
attitude.29 In the former, 187 placard-carrying demonstrators walked
along the State House grounds to protest racial discrimination. Strongly
sympathetic to such peaceful protest, an 8-1 Court reversed the picket-
ers' conviction for breach of the peace: "South Carolina [had] infringed
the petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free
assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances." 0
The picketers, in fact, had "exercise[d] . . . basic constitutional rights
in their most pristine and classic form." 31
25 As disputing reliance on labor law, see KALvEN, Tm NEGRO AND T s FTsT AMEND-
MENT 134-35 (1965); Kalven, The Public Forum 3 n.15; KONVrrz, EXPANDING LmERTiES 311
(1966); cf. Molofsky v. Bundy 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2582 (Baltimore Cir. Ct. April 16, 1966). But
see the following decisions and articles, in which labor and non-labor picketing have been
analogized explicitly, or implidtly, by use of traditional labor picketing rhetoric. Ex parte
Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 299, 81 P.2d 190, 193 (1938); Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond,
152 Misc. 846, 847; 274 N.Y. Supp. 250, 251-52 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Individual Retail Food
Store Owners' Ass'n v. Penn Treaty Food Stores Ass'n, 33 Pa. D. & C. 100, 110 (1938);
Feinberg, Picketing, Free Speech, and "Labor Disputes," 17 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 385 (1940);
Note, Non-Labor Picketing and the Thornhill Case, 41 COLum. L. REv. 89 (1941). See
also Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, at 1290-91 (1964).
Professor Kamin, in Kamin, Picketing 182-205, deals at length with the analogy
afforded by labor picketing, urging that reliance on labor precedent by proponents of
non-labor residential picketing is misplaced, since the imprimatur of the free speech
identification has long since been diluted. See note 40 inIra. To foreclose this analogy,
however, is not to resolve the question of non-labor picketing.
26 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
27 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
28 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
29 For a thorough analysis and comparison of the decisions, see Kalven, The Public
Forum 4-10.
30 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
31 Ibid.
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Such clear language would appear to have firmly established non-labor
picketing as an approved activity. In the two Cox decisions, however,
the Court took a more restrictive view of this practice. Cox was arrested
and charged with four offenses after leading a group of civil rights
marchers into downtown Baton Rouge.32 The marchers' goal was to
gather before the courthouse to protest the practice of segregation and
the earlier arrest of twenty-three of their compatriots. While in the
first decision the Court reversed Cox's conviction for blocking public
passageways,33 it rejected his argument as to the constitutional protec-
tions afforded his activity with language as clear as that in Edwards,
but far less felicitous in tone:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by the appellant
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same
kind of freedom to those who will communicate ideas by
conduct such as patrolling, marching and picketing on streets
and highways, as those amendments afford to those who com-
municate ideas by pure speech.34
This statement must, of course, be tempered by the actual disposition
of the case, since the conviction was overturned. Yet the tenor of the
majority opinion indicates at the least far less sympathy for the demon-
strators' tactics than did that in Edwards, even allowing for the factual
disparities between the two cases.85 The proponent of an activity such
as residential picketing cannot therefore cite an unvarying judicial
commitment to peaceful demonstrations in its defense.
The second Cox decision raises a further issue-that of the improper
forum. The Court here considered Cox's conviction for violating a
Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing of courthouses. 6 Mr. Justice
32 The offenses were criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public
passageways, and courthouse picketing. Cox was acquitted of the first offense; the Court
reversed the other three convictions.
83 The Court reasoned that the enforcement of the "obstructing public passages" statute
was such that broad, undirected discretion was vested in local officials in the use of the
streets. Thus such a system was equivalent to licensing, and Cox's freedom of speech and
assembly were consequently unwarrantedly abridged. 379 U.S. at 557-58.
34 379 U.S. at 555.
35 There were only 187 demonstrators in Edwards, while 2000 protestors marched to
the courthouse in Cox. The marchers were on the street in Cox, while they were in a
"horseshoe" area at the State House grounds in Edwards. Moreover, three offenses were
involved in Cox 1, while Edwards concerned only a breach of the peace conviction. Despite
these and other distinctions, the Court in Cox I noted the similarities between the two
demonstrations. 379 U.S. at 548. Moreover, there still remains a basic difference in tone
between Edwards and Cox 1. As Professor Kalven observes: "[I]n a curious echo of the
idiom of Edwards, [Mr. Justice Goldberg] wrote that the Court was not dealing [in Cox 1]
with speech 'in its pristine form' but with conduct of a totally different character."
Kalven, The Public Forum 7.
36 LA. RLv. STAT. 14:401 (Supp. 1962).
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Goldberg noted that the Baton Rouge police chief had given per-
mission to patrol across from the courthouse. In effect, the officer de-
fined the word "near" in the statute so as to remove the area across
from the building from its compass. Having thereby given an impri-
matur of legality to the demonstration, the authorities could not then
order Cox and his followers to disperse because they had exceeded the
time limit allotted them, since none of the statutes for which Cox was
arrested authorized the drawing of such time lines.37
Despite this successful endeavor to absolve Cox, Mr. Justice Gold-
berg strongly supported the constitutionality of the statute. In its
justification he cited the necessity for an impartial judiciary; he sug-
gested that if a judge's decision happened to be in accord with the
pleas of the demonstrators, a suspicion of acquiescence to these pleas
might arise. While these justifications are not without difficulty,38
the importance of the opinion for residential picketing lies in the limits
it suggests for the concept of the public forum. There may be certain
sites so unsuited to use by protest groups that once a legislative deter-
mination has identified them, further traditionally considered variables
of time and manner have no bearing.
Thus, the Cox decisions raise several important considerations in
analyzing residential picketing. Non-labor picketing is labeled as
"speech plus. '39 An identification associated with labor picketing,40
37 879 U.S. at 572-73.
38 Ideally a legislature should also be free of undue pressures, even if it is properly
more responsive to the public will than is the judiciary. Yet, as Edwards established,
demonstrations before state legislatures are a welcome exercise of basic freedoms. Earlier
decisions of the Court refusing to sustain contempt convictions for critical publications
concerning pending or already decided cases, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946), Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), are not as easily reconciled as Mr.
Justice Goldberg maintains, see 379 U.S. 559, 563-64. It is not at all self-evident that the
courthouse picketers would have any more influence on the judiciary than would vituper-
ative utterances of newspaper editorialists or pamphleteers. Of course, Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's rationale for distinction-the broadness of the contempt power as compared to a
narrow statute such as that in Cox I-avoids these considerations.
39 It may well be that "pure speech" is an impossibility. The moment a word is
realized in sound or in print, it impinges on the senses, even if only those of the speaker
or the writer. Thus, the speech plus-pure speech distinction has come under attack. See
Kalven, The Public Forum 23-25.
Whatever the failings of a conceptual framework drawn in terms of "pure speech" and
"speech plus," it would appear that if dissemination of ideas or petition of government
were the sole aims of the picketers, they could have achieved their ends by the more
usual forms of expression and petition. The very fact that the residence is chosen as the
site of the picketing would seem to indicate that the conduct aspect of such activity-
the picket line-is intended to serve as more than merely the vehicle by which the
picketers make public their grievance.
40 The free speech-picketing idiom was given constitutional sanction in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941), when the Court brought peaceful labor picketing within the
ambit of free speech. In a series of subsequent decisions, however, culminating in Inter-
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such a characterization recognizes that picketing is conduct as well as
speech; that the physical presence of aggrieved citizens seeking to
advance their cause makes picketing something more than the spoken
or printed word.41 Cox II establishes that certain legislatively desig-
nated sites may be withdrawn from the public forum. The Court speaks
of time, place, and manner,42 yet the anomaly is that variables of time
and manner are irrelevant: the site-the courthouse-is simply un-
suited for demonstrations.
While the Cox decisions and Edwards dearly set the background, they
are not determinative of the residential picketing question. Edwards
must be read in light of Cox. The first Cox case is of only general appli-
cation, and the second, while more closely on point, cannot be read too
broadly, for even in considering demonstrations only before public
buildings, Mr. Justice Goldberg cautioned:
[E]ntirely different considerations would apply if, for ex-
ample, the demonstrators were picketing to protest the actions
of a mayor or other official of a city completely unrelated to
any judicial proceedings, who just happened *to have an office
located in the courthouse building.43
Since prior decisions cannot resolve the residential picketing ques-
tion, it is suggested that the basis for a solution which reasonably ac-
commodates the interests of both sides is to be found by weighing the
detriments incurred by the homeowner-public official44 against the ben-
efits normally accruing to those who picket his residence.45
national Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), the Court significantly
narrowed the initially broad scope of ThornhilL See generally GREGORY, LABOR AND THE
LAw, ch. 11 (1961). As a result, labor picketing may be quite freely regulated by the
states today, KALVEN, Tim NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 134 (1965), although in fact
federal pre-emption under the National Labor Relations Act operates so as to preclude
significant state intervention into the regulation of picketing. Kamin, Picketing 197.
41 Cf. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950), in which a business was
picketed by a group seeking proportional racial hiring: "Publication in a newspaper, or
by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charges
as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert
influences, and it produces consequences different from other modes of communication.
The loyalties and responses evoked and enacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing
from appeals by printed word."
42 379 U.S. at 574.
43 Id. at 567.
44 In a statement made following the picketing of his home, and the homes of school
board members, Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley complained: "Surely this behavior is
reprehensible, indecent and immoral .... It's a much different thing to picket a man's
home then (sic) picketing his office. It becomes a question of affecting one's family."
Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 17, 1963, p. 14, cols. 1-4.
45 Cf. United Electrical Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235, 242 (D. Conn. 1946);
SMLBERMAN, Cass IN BLAcK AND WHITE 330 (1964).
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THE DETRIMENTS AND THE BENEFITS
The Nuisance Factor
Probably the most immediate reactions engendered by residential
picketing are that it constitutes a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.
Two Supreme Court decisions illustrate the balancing which has
occurred when a claim to use of the streets is weighed against the
nuisance created by that use. In Schneider v. State4 6 the Court had
before it ordinances whose alleged aim was to eliminate litter by either
prohibiting, or requiring a permit for, the distribution of handbills
on the streets. In striking down three of these ordinances, the Court
reasoned that "the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good ap-
pearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person
rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing
to receive it.''47 Clearly, then, the aim of deterring litter cannot justify
proscription of street-corner pamphleteering. Kovacs v. Cooper8 pre-
sented a related situation. A Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance for-
bade the operation of loudspeaker trucks on the city streets. The
appellant was convicted of its violation, having used such a device
to comment on a labor dispute then in progress. In sustaining the
conviction, the Court maintained that "constitutional protection"
could not be called forth to protect "what those charged with public
welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity
are open." 49 Auditory disturbance, at least if it is "loud and raucous," 50
will apparently justify limiting the use of the streets.
46 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
47 Id. at 162.
48 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
49 Id. at 88-89.
50 Two cases involving loudspeaker trucks have been passed on by the Supreme Court.
The confusion they produced cautions against too heavy reliance on Kovacs. In Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Court struck down a municipal ordinance prohibiting
the operation of sound trucks unless a police permit was obtained. While recognizing
the right of municipalities to regulate the use of the streets, the Court found the ordinance
unconstitutional as a prior restraint on free speech.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), a 5-4 decision, was handed down not long there-
after, the majority producing three opinions. The confusion this multiplicity of opinions
creates is augmented by the ambiguity of the ordinance itself, since it could be read as
banning all sound trucks or only "loud and raucous" ones. Of the majority, Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson would have upheld the ordinance as an absolute ban on all
sound truck use. The other three Justices in the majority, Justices Reed, Vinson, and
Burton, upheld the ordinance because the New Jersey courts had read it as only barring
sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous noises." Thus, these three, combined with the
four dissenters, felt that not all sound trucks could be banned.
The Court also could not agree as to whether Saia was overruled by Kovacs. Reasoning
that there was no problem of prior restraint in the latter, Justices Reed and Burton, and
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It is not possible to extract determinative criteria from these decisions
as to when a disturbing practice involving speech can be prohibited.
However, Kovacs does at least show that a serious enough disruption
can be legislatively proscribed. Both cases deal with what, had they
been legally categorized, would be termed public nuisances-distur-
bances which affect all, or a significant segment, of the public.51 It is
the legal category of private nuisance, however, looking to the discom-
forts inflicted on the specific property owner,52 which is more properly
assimilable to the residential picketing situation. Despite this correla-
tion, no American decisions have spoken in terms of "nuisance. '53
However, in J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins,54 an English case, this step
was suggested. Master of Rolls Lindley reasoned that a nuisance action
was supportable, for "such conduct seriously interferes with the ordi-
nary comfort of human existence and ordinary enjoyment of the house
beset . . . 55
Chief Justice Vinson, distinguished the two decisions. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
based their opinions on their dissents in Saia. Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge
argued that Kovacs repudiated the earlier loudspeaker case. Perhaps the confusion pro-
duced is best commented upon by Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting: "How, on such a
hashing of different views of the thing forbidden, Kovacs could have known with what
he was charged or could have prepared a defense, I am unable to see. How anyone can
do either in the future, under this decision, I am equally at loss to say." Id. at 105.
51 PRossER, ToRTs 605 (3d ed. 1964): "The term [public nuisance] comprehends a
miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, based on some interference
with the interests of the community or the comfort or convenience of the general public."
52 In regard to private nuisances, Professor Prosser has written: "The essence of a
private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land . . . . [M]any
interferences with personal comfort .... which at first glance would appear to be wrongs
purely personal to the landholder, are treated as nuisances because they interfere with
that right to the undisturbed enjoyment of the premises which is inseparable from
ownership of the property." Id. at 611.
53 Some old labor cases have referred to picketing of businesses as a nuisance. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Cooks' Union, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417 (1919); Hughes v. Kansas City
Motion Picture Machine Operators, 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 632
(1920); F. C. Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516, 531, 279 S.W. 232, 236 (1926):
"When, however, intimidation, threats, and violence are resorted to, the picketing, so con-
ducted, may properly be held to establish a nuisance and is subject to be enjoined."
54 [1899] 1 Ch. D. 255. See also Reg. v. Donnelly & Brierly, an unreported Cana-
dian decision cited in Winkler, Picketing of Private Homes: The Anomalous Peaceful
Picketing Clause, 2 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 437, 447, 450 (1963); Rex v. Elford, 87 Can. Crim.
Cas. 372 (1947).
55 [1899] 1 Ch. D. 255, 267-68 (opinion of Master of Rolls Lindley). Chitty, L.J., also
concluded that the activity here was a nuisance. Id. at 271. The court held that the de-
fendants' activity violated a statute forbidding watching and besetting a man's house, save
for the purpose of obtaining and communicating information. Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act, 38 & 39 Vict,, c. 86, § 7 (1875). (By the Trade Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7,
C. 47 (1906), it was made lawful to "attend at or near a house or place where a person
resides" for the purpose of "peacefully obtaining or communicating information" or of
"peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working." Trade Disputes
Residential Picketing
While the Lyons language is well taken, it has been said in regard
to private nuisances that "by prevailing view, interference must affect
the physical senses of the occupant rather than his state of mind."'5 6
Admittedly, silent picketers may only affect the sensation of sight, and
even this disturbance may be minimal for the public official secluded
on the 20th floor of an apartment building. Nevertheless, the resi-
dential picketer undeniably induces some sort of mental distress in
the homeowner. It is this disorientation of the residential environment,
and its consequences upon the official and his family, which brings
residential picketing close to, even if not completely within, the ambit
of nuisance law.
Privacy
While past decisions do not present a clear resolution where the
homeowner's interest in privacy is weighed against the values of free
speech, it is clear that privacy has been considered a significant, and
perhaps even determinative, factor.5 7 In Martin v. City of Struthers5"
the appellant, who had distributed religious literature, was convicted
of violating an ordinance prohibiting house-to-house distribution of
circulars. In balancing competing interests, the Court concluded that
the homeowner's desire for privacy was outweighed by considerations
of free speech and the free exercise of religion. While deferent to
privacy's importance, the Court felt that the individual householder
could dissuade solicitation, whereas use of an ordinance cut off com-
munication to those who would choose to listen.59 In the later case
of Breard v. Alexandria,0 however, the Court upheld an ordinance
which prohibited house-to-house solicitation. It balanced the house-
holder's "desire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute
publications" 61 by such solicitation, and found the latter interest sub-
ordinate.
Martin and Breard are not necessarily inconsistent, although
Act, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 2 (1906). In 1927 residential picketing was made unlawful. Trade
Unions Act, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 22 (1927). This act has since been repealed by the Trade
Disputes and Trade Union Act, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 52 (1946).
The court's discussion of nuisance in Lyons has not gone without criticism. See Finkel-
man, The Law of Picketing in Canada: I, 2 U. of TORONTO L.J. 67, 98-99 (1937). However,
the author acknowledges that on its facts Lyons is supportable. Id. at 90.
56 MAR-z, RIGHTS INCIDENT TO POSSESSION OF LAND 73 n.2 (1954).
57 See generally Comment, Constitutional Right of Privacy, 40 N.C.L. REv. 788, 794-99
(1962).
58 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
59 But see CH .x, Fmaa SPrCH IN Tm UNITED STATES 406-07 (1948).
60 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
61 Id. at 644.
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the dissent in the latter subscribed to this view.6 2 In dealing with the
problems of free speech, the Court has endorsed a distinction between
public appeals involving commercial endeavors and those concerning
dissemination of political and religious information. Thus, the distribu-
tion on the streets of leaflets propagandizing religion may not be un-
duly suppressed, but only regulated, while municipal authorities are
not similarly constrained when the handbill's message is commercial
advertising.63
Certainly the Martin decision, even if narrowly read as condemnation
of a specific mode of prohibition, detracts from privacy's standing as
a determinative factor in considering proscription of residential pick-
eting. However, several distinctions, suggested by the loudspeaker truck
case, Kovacs v. Cooper,6 4 mitigate its weight. In Kovacs the message
being disseminated dealt with a labor dispute, a matter long recognized
as being of public concern, 65 yet the ordinance was upheld. Clearly,
then, the method used to convey speech on the streets may justify pro-
hibition even if that speech is non-commercial in character. The speech
in Kovacs involved a significant plus factor-the noise of the loud-
speakers. The activity in Martin, on the other hand, was less pervasive
and persistent-a single ringing of the doorbell is soon terminated,
and not likely repeated. In terms of duration of the disturbance,
the possibility of its repetition, and the degree of discomfort, residential
picketing would seem to approximate the Kovacs situation, rather than
that in Martin.
There is another distinction which the Martin opinion suggests.
The Court reasoned that the householder could simply reject the
religious propagandist by indicating in an appropriate manner a desire
not to be disturbed. The same flexibility of approach would not be
available to dissuade loudspeaker users. The same is true, of course,
of the victim of residential picketers-it is doubtful that he could
discourage their efforts by a simple doorstep confrontation.
This reading of Martin and Kovacs, augmented by the solicitude for
the homeowner's privacy evidenced in Breard, presses for recognition
of privacy as a strong factor militating against residential picketing.66
62 Id. at 649-50.
63 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316, U.S. 52 (1942). See also Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
64 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
65 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941).
66 Even in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941), see note 40 supra, which origi-
nally assimilated labor picketing to free speech, privacy was acknowledged as a valid
competing interest to be considered when picketing is pursued. Id. at 105. See also Carl-
son v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1941).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the importance of the homeowner's
privacy has been acknowledged, either explicitly or by implication,
in several decisions dealing with labor residential picketing.67 A
recent non-labor residential picketing decision presents one of the
strongest statements of this view. In Molofsky v. Bundy6 the court
enjoined patrolling of a tavern licensee's home by citizens protesting
the opening of the tavern in their neighborhood, stating that:
When the right to free speech (which is not synonymous with
picketing) is weighed against the right to privacy, the balance
favors the privacy of the home.6 9
The Public Man and the Alternative Situs
While it is clear, then, that the factor of privacy cannot be ignored,
it must be recognized that the homeowner of concern here is a public
official. By the very nature of his calling, he has consciously exposed
himself to public scrutiny. The tort law of privacy, recognizing this,
has found that the public figure possesses only a limited right of pri-
vacy.70 A large number of authorities have in fact maintained that he
has no such right.71 The law of defamation has similarly noted the
67 See, e.g., United Electrical Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946);
Jacobs v. United Furniture Workers, 16 CCH Lab. Gas. 65,065 (LA. County Super. Ct.
Cal. 1949); State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 Minn.
481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936); State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 811 (1930); Evening
Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N.J. 71, 199 At. 598
(1938); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941).
68 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2582 (Balt. Cir. Ct. April 16, 1966). See also New York Times,
May 15, 1966, § 4, p. 6, cols. 1-2.
69 U.S.L. WEK 2582 (April 16, 1966). While the court's adherence to protection of the
homeowner's privacy is, it is suggested here, admirable, the opinion is somewhat flawed.
Reliance is placed on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Mr. Justice
Douglas invoked a constitutional right of marital privacy to strike down a Connecticut
birth control law. The discovery of a limited form of privacy to render state action
unconstitutional cannot determine the ability of a state court to enjoin private action
disruptive of a dissimilar form of privacy. See also Zeeman v. Amalgamated Retail &
Dept. Store Employees Union Local 44(D), 25 L.R.R.M. 2343, 17 CCH Lab. Gas. 65,572
at 76,928 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Cal. 1950), and 26 L.R.R.M. 2422 (1950), where the same
court reversed itself. It had first denied an injunction restraining residential picketing,
and in doing so, rejected an argument based on invasion of right of privacy. (Within the
context of California law, however, it did not have so to reason. See 38 Geo. L.J. 687 (1950).)
In the second decision, some months later, it reversed and granted the injunction without
preserving its rationale as to its disposition of the privacy argument.
70 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 118 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). See also PROssER,
ToRis 845 (3d ed. 1964). This is apparently the majority view. See Spiegel, Public Celeb-
rity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 80 So. CAL. L. REV. 280, 297
(1957).
71 See Spiegel, supra note 70, at 296.
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public nature of a well-known figure's life.72 Thus, the public figure
has "to be able to take it,"73 and not "go about with his feelings on his
sleeve." 74 The Supreme Court has gone so far as to adopt the rule, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,75 that an official cannot recover dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood unless the statement was uttered with
"actual malice."
Yet the interests of the public official are not entirely subordinated
to those of the public. Both privacy and libel law have endorsed a
distinction between the public official as a public man and as a private
citizen. Thus, the Sullivan rule is limited to statements relating to
"official conduct"; 76 and the tort law of privacy disavows investigation
"into those matters and transactions of private life which are wholly
foreign, and can throw no light whatever upon the question as to [the
official's] competency for the office, or the propriety of bestowing it
upon him."77 Acceptance of the public figure as having a diluted right
of privacy does not, therefore, dispositively weight the argument in
favor of residential picketing; it would seem that his home is so disso-
ciated from his governmental functions as to stand apart from the
public aspect of his life.78
72 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875 (1949). See also Themo v. New
England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 57, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940): "The
fundamental difference between a right to privacy and a right to freedom from defama-
tion is that the former directly concerns one's own peace of mind, while the latter
concerns primarily one's reputation .... ." see generally Wade, Defamation and the
Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. Rav. 1093 (1962). Of course, federal law provides for an
extensive use of the official's privilege to commit defamation and be immune from suit.
(State law is not so clear.) Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959); cf. Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.). See also Kurat v. County of Nassau, 264 N.Y.S.2d
126 (Sup. Ct. 1965). The purpose in this, however, is not to salve the official's sensitivities,
but to insure that he is not harassed by suits and need not therefore fear to act. See
generally Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. Rav.
1127 (1962), wherein the author urges that there be only a qualified privilege.
73 People v. Drucker, 167 Misc. 557, 4 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (Kings County Ct. 1938).
74 Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publishing Co., 41 F. Supp. 163, 168 (S.D. Tex. 1941).
75 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
76 Id. at 279.
77 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 199-200, 50 S.E. 68, 72 (1905). See
also Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co., 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943); Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193, 216 (1891).
78 Cf. PRossEaR, Toars 848 (3d ed. 1964). If the official's office were in his home, and
there were thus no other suitable forum wherein he could be directly confronted, picket-
ing of the home would perhaps have to be allowed. See Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468 (1937). Contra, State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939). A publicly
supported residence would also be arguably more amenable to residential picketing. Such
residences would be Gracie Mansion, which has been picketed, see Sunday New York
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That area which does have direct relevance to the official's public
character is the office, at which the action causing the grievance was
taken and which is the locus of his authority.7 9 The public parks, also,
while not as related to the grievance, are open to the protestors8 0
These sites afford suitable areas for remonstrance. Subscribing to
similar reasoning, some of the labor residential picketing cases have
endorsed the idea of limiting picketing to the site associated with the
complaint. Thus, in Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v.
American Newspaper Guild8l the court affirmed the lower court's re-
straining orders: "The lawful place for defendants' picketing operations
is at the site of the employment ... where the working conditions to
which the strikers object or which they seek to improve do or will
maintain . "...,,82
Despite the logic of confining disputes to the source of their origin,
rather than only peripherally associated sites, it is clear that an appro-
priate use of the streets cannot be abridged merely by arguing that
other sites are available.8 3 However, since the disruptive consequences
of residential picketing call into question its appropriateness, it is
worthwhile to note the presence of other areas of expression, since
these appreciably lessen the danger of prohibition which totally stifles
communication. Of course, justifying proscription of residential picket-
ing by invoking the availability of alternative sites is premised partly on
the assumption that the picketing of public buildings is possible. Such
exercise was strongly sanctioned in Edwards v. South Carolina.s4 While
legislative proscription of such activity has occurred, as evidenced in
Times, Oct. 11, 1964, § 1, p. 80, cols. 2-3, and the White House, see Scott v. District
of Columbia, 184 A.2d 849 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1962).
79 Cf. People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487, 493 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941). Picketing at the
office site has been before the courts in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963);
Scott v. District of Columbia, 184 A.2d 849 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1962) (judicial note taken of
picketing of the White House); Matter of Brinn, 305 N.Y. 887, 114 N.E.2d 430 (1953);
People v. Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 144 N.E.2d 81, 165 N.Y.S.2d 113 (picketing at the United
Nations building in New York City). See also Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1965, § IB, p. 5,
cols. 3-4 (picketing of Justice Department building in Washington, D.C.).
80 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
81 124 N.J. Eq. 71, 199 Ad. 598 (1938).
82 Id. at 83, 199 AtI. at 605. See also Jacobs v. United Furniture Workers, 16 CCH Lab.
Cas. 65,065 at 75,372 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Cal. 1949); cf. State v. Perry, 196 Minn.
481, 482, 265 N.W. 302 (1936); Hebrew Home and Hospital for Chronic Sick, Inc.
v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d 173, 177-78, 235 N.Y.S.2d 318, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Springfield, Bay-
side Corp. v. Hochman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1964); People v.
Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y. Supp. 629 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 565, 195 N.E. 202
(1934).
83 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
84 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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the second Cox decision and in Frend v. United States, 5 these instances
are manifestations of specific needs rather than examples of a general
policy.88
The usual type of residential picketing, which it is suggested should
be properly removed to the public building, will involve an official
who can be, and should be, responsive to the public will. At this junc-
ture, Edwards assumes its proper relevancy. Of course, even in Edwards
the Court acknowledged the feasibility of a statute prohibiting demon-
strations before the state legislatures.87 However, while the dangers of
steadily diminishing sites for demonstration may be discomfortingly
real, 88 it would be anamalous to argue that because the courthouse or
85 100 F.2d 691, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1938).
86 Cox is explicable in terms of the building-a courthouse-which was withdrawn
from the possible sites for demonstrations, and the desire to maintain the impartiality
of the judiciary. In Frend, a joint resolution of Congress prohibiting demonstrations
within 500 feet of foreign embassies was upheld and the conviction of the appellants sus-
tained. The court relied in part on the peculiar requirements of relations with other
nations in reaching this conclusion. Of course, other quasi-public buildings have been
removed from the potential sites for picketing. See, e.g., Abyssinian Baptist Church v.
African Nationalist Movement, 71 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
87 372 U.S. at 236.
88 In Adderley v. Florida, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4013 (Nov. 14, 1966) a sharply divided 5-4
Court sustained the malicious trespass convictions of 32 demonstrators who had gathered
on the driveway and lawn area of a county jail. Unlike the second Cox decision, 379
U.S. 559 (1965), and Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1938),
see notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text, there was no legislative designation of jails
as sites unsuitable for protest. Mr. Justice Black's opinion is therefore significant for its
suggestion of a criterion to determine such areas, when these have not been otherwise
defined: "In Edwards, the demonstrators went to the South Carolina State Capitol grounds
to protest. In this case they went to the jail. Traditionally, state capitol grounds are
open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not." 35 U.S.L. WEEK at 4014.
(Emphasis added.) Traditional usages of public areas, then, will serve as a guideline for
determining the appropriateness of potential demonstration sites.
But characterizing the activity here as a "petition for redress of grievances," 35 U.S.L.
W= at 4017, Mr. Justice Douglas argued, in a dissent in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Brennan and Fortas joined: "The jailhouse, like an executive mansion, a legisla-
tive chamber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself . . . is one of the seats of govern-
ment whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or a small county jail. And when
it houses political prisoners or those whom many think are unjustly held, it is an obvious
center for protest." 35 U.S.L. WEEK at 4016.
Two other recent opinions, both of little help, have been handed down by the
Supreme Court in regard to the employment of public buildings for peaceful dem-
onstrations. In Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), the petitioners were con-
victed under a Mississippi statute prohibiting picketing or mass demonstrations "in such
manner as to obstruct or interfere with free ingress or egress to or from any public
premises ... or so as to obstruct or interfere with free use of public streets, sidewalks or
other public ways adjacent thereto." Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2318.5 (Supp. 1964). In a 5-4
per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the district court's decision, which had denied
the appellants' attempt to enjoin enforcement of the law, and remanded. It did not
approach the question of whether demonstrations before public buildings are constitu-
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the legislature may not be picketed, the home of the judge or legislator
is a necessary situs. If the aim is to protect the official, and to insulate
him from untoward pressures, the first step in implementing this goal
is to guard his home life.
"The Freedom Not to Listen"-The Captive Audience
The terms "nuisance" and "privacy" evoke numerous, not easily
articulated connotations. Even as terms of legal art, they are ambiguous.
When applied to residential picketing, they involve a problem which
has gained increasing consideration. 9 The official and his family are
a captive audience,90 a circumstance detailed by the Court in Kovacs v.
Cooper,"1 which concerned regulation of loudspeaker trucks:
The unwilling listener is not like the passerby who may be
offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take
it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless
to escape the interference with his privacy by loud-
speakers9 ....
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak93 presents the Court's most
notable confrontation with the captive audience. The Commission had
allowed a privately owned public utility corporation. to install radio
receivers in the buses it operated. Consequently, passengers were sub-
jected to programming of which 90% was music and 10% was com-
mercials and announcements. It was contended on behalf of the
tionally protected. (Actually, this question was not raised, since the appellants' contentions
were based on the vagueness of the statute, and on the inequality of its application.)
Brown v. Louisiana, 86 S. Ct. 719 (1966), also is of no aid in discerning the availability
of areas outside public buildings for peaceful demonstrations. The petitioner Negroes,
who had gathered in a public library, were convicted of violating a Louisiana statute
making it a criminal offense to congregate in a public building with intent to provoke, or
under circumstances that might occasion, a breach of the peace, and to refuse to move on
when so ordered. On certiorari, the Court reversed, four Justices, in 2 opinions, finding no
evidence to warrant the conviction, and Mr. Justice Brennan finding the statute overly
broad. However, since the activity in question occurred in a building, the case is clearly
distinguishable.
89 See, e.g., KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND TF FIRST AMENDMENT 147-60; KONVrTZ, FUNDA-
MENTAL LmnERTms OF A Faa= PFOPLE 119-27 (1957).
90 This consequence is specifically acknowledged in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578
(1965) (Black, J., concurring); cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
91 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
92 Id. at 86-87 It is suggested here that "listener" should not be read literally so as to
deny the assertion that silent picketers do not make the homeowner a captive audience.
While the picketers may be silent, their presence constitutes a pressure which impinges on
the senses.
93 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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passengers that the Commission's order violated the Fifth Amendment
by invading privacy. The Court rejected this contention, but in doing
so it drew a distinction between the home and a bus:
This position wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment
secures to each passenger on a public vehicle . . . a right of
privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is
entitled in his own home.... 94
Although the Court did not pass on the rights of the captive
homeowner, it did thus acknowledge the distinction between his
plight and that of an "individual in a public vehicle or public place." 95
This distinction is a reasonable one, for while a bus is invested with
a public character, the home is the retreat of the individual. Moreover,
the passenger knowingly accepts the discomforts to which he will be
exposed. 6 This is not the case with residential picketing, where the
only recourse presented the homeowner and his family is to leave their
home. Such an eventuality negates the traditional notions of security
and privacy associated with the home in our society.97
Admittedly, the problem of the captive audience arises whenever
picketing occurs. Because the situs of concern here is the home, however,
the problem is particularly acute. While the public official's obliga-
tions to his constituents arguably create a duty on his part to listen
to their grievances,"" the same burden cannot be said to be incumbent
upon his family.
The Case for the Picketers
It remains to be determined whether the advantages which the
residential picketers derive are persuasive enough to outweigh the
94 Id. at 464.
95 Id. at 465.
96 But see Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. Rav. 960, 964-65 (1953). Interestingly, a recent novel about a fictional Supreme
Court Justice recreates the facts of the Pollak case. In the novel, the majority finds a
violation of the Constitution. In preparing the majority opinion, the protagonist reasons:
"The relationship between the bus company and the passengers isn't voluntary. They're
forced to ride--and therefore forced to listen. Ordinary people can't afford to take taxis
to work every day, or keep a car, or move to another neighborhood just to avoid some-
thing they find annoying." WooixoLK, OPINION OF THE COURT 119 (1966).
97 In commenting on the special nature of the home, it has been written: "Freedom of
the home is as important as freedom of speech." CHAFEE, FREE SPEEcH IN THE UNITED
STATEs 407 (1948 ed.). Illustrative of the special notions of security associated with
one's domicile is People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914), explicating
that there is no duty in criminal law to retreat when the householder is attacked in his
own home.
98 See, e.g., Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
Rv. 729, 732-33 (1961).
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interests of the homeowner-public official. As has been noted, the
picketers' claim to the streets is a powerful one, predicated not only
on the fact that they are engaged in activity involving the expression
of political ideas, but also on the nature of the streets as a traditional
public forum.99
The streets and sidewalks afford the picketers the benefit of minimal
costs. This consideration cannot be dismissed; it is often those who are
most aggrieved, and whose grievances most deserve publication, who
are least able to finance the expression of their complaints. 100 Economics
alone, however, is small justification for residential picketing.' Since
other sites remain open, there can be little added monetary burden
flowing from their use. Moreover, the mundane problems of logistics
probably make central assembly areas more accessible, and hence more
economical, than comparatively isolated neighborhoods.
More significant are the dual factors of publication and publicity:
[T]here are not so many places and times available to the
ordinary speaker, and the assurance of an interested audience
is not always easy. For even if listeners must be free not to
listen, the public freedom of speech requires that all speakers
have a chance to reach them.102
Because residential picketing is an unusual mode of remonstrance, it
may well earn the picketers a larger audience through the news media
than they could otherwise obtain.10 3 Yet access to audiences cannot
justify what would otherwise be an unwarranted activity. Of course,
there may be a curious system of inverse progressions operating, whereby
as the difficulty of reaching one's audience increases, the permissible
bars to communication decrease. 0 4 Thus, the ease of other means of
publication served as a justification for sustaining the ordinance in the
99 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
100 Cf. Adderly v. Florida, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4018, 4017 (Nov. 14, 1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
101 Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 36 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (quoted in text accompanying note
49 supra).
102 MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC 112 (1965).
103 In a speech before the Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, on September 28,
1966, Mayor Daley of Chicago criticized news media coverage of civil rights demonstra-
tions, condemning their preoccupation with conflict. He cited the assignment of thirty-
seven newsmen to report the patrolling of his home by eighteen pickets as an example
of news coverage disproportionate to the event. Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 29, 1966, p. 8,
reaction by Mayor Daley's neighbors warranted television coverage. Chicago Sun-Times,
Sept. 29, 1966, p. 9, cols. 1-8. See Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 17, 1963, p. 14, cols. 1-4, at
col. 4; cf. Kamin, Picketing 214-15.
cols. 1-6. In justification, a news media representative reasoned that the possibility of
104 See, e.g., Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 815 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
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loudspeaker case, 05 while the relative penury of religious propagandists
served as a rationale for striking down the Martin ordinance,106 which
barred house-to-house solicitation.
Whether this be the case or not, it would seem clear that the con-
stant public examination of the public official's life and of his actions
provides ready access to news channels. Picketing at a site other than
his home would therefore still find an audience in the news media.
Moreover, in terms of the public's personal confrontation with the
picketing, the official's office will almost certainly be situated in a
location more frequented by the public than is his home. Thus, the
loss in publicity which would follow from precluding the residential
situs as a forum is probably appreciably offset by these factors.
Another consideration which weighs in favor of residential picketing
is its persuasive impact on the public official. The singularity of the
activity, combined with the physical presence of aggrieved citizens
and with the mentally distressing consequences of this presence, may
serve to impress and even persuade the official more than would news-
paper editorials or picketing of his office. Similar sentiments were
voiced by the court in United Electrical Workers v. Baldwin,07 which
involved labor residential picketing:
Picketing of this type brings home the fact that a man may
leave his tools at his work, but not his conscience or his rela-
tions with his fellow man.108
Thus, also, the public official's recognition of his responsibility to his
constituents should not cease once he enters the confines of his home;
residential picketing emphasizes this fact to him. Nevertheless, the
news media and other opinion-creating bodies do strongly influence
the official. The continual and contrary pressures exerted on him are
significant, even without the added factor of picketers outside his
home. Again, even tort law, which only affords the public figure
limited protection, does not vouchsafe unwarranted invasion into his
private life, even though added publicity and persuasiveness might be
gained thereby.
Summary
The arguments in favor of residential picketing largely converge on
the "sales" aspect of speech. Their thrust concerns entrance into the
105 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (quoted in text accompanying note 49
supra).
106 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
107 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946).
108 Id. at 242.
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proverbial "marketplace of ideas." Undeniably, the advantages of
publicity and impact are to a degree unique, and are dependent on
the residence as the situs of picketing. These benefits can be approxi-
mated by picketing, as well as other forms of remonstrance, elsewhere.
On the other hand, the "costs" incurred by the homeowner-public
official are singular. He and his family are made a captive audience;
the privacy and enjoyment of their home are disturbed. Unlike the
protestors, the homeowner and his family do not have a choice of alter-
natives-they cannot go to another home.
THE FORM OF PROHIBITION
If the interests of the homeowner-public official are deemed suffi-
ciently compelling to warrant the regulation or proscription of resi-
dential picketing, as is suggested here, the question arises as to how
the law can effect this end. Three approaches are available: (1) appli-
cation of common law offenses; (2) use of a licensing system; or (3)
enactment of a statute specifically prohibiting the activity.
The Common Law-Nuisance and Privacy
While both nuisance and invasion of privacy are potential legal
categories in which to place residential picketing, they possess serious
drawbacks both in terms of applicability and application. It has been
said in regard to nuisance that "probably no single tort embraces a
wider variety of wrongs."' 0 9 While common principles are applied to
both public and private nuisances," 0 there is one distinction between
the two which is significant in dealing with residential picketing. This
is the problem of the proper plaintiff. A municipality cannot seek
redress for a private nuisance, nor can an individual seek remedy for
a public nuisance unless he suffers some special injury. I" Undoubtedly
there will be occasions when the disruptive consequences of residential
picketing will be so generalized as to allow the public authorities to
act. However, a small group of silent marchers may have a deleterious
effect solely on their specific target. Therefore, to accept the nuisance
category as sufficient always to enable municipal action is not feasible.
Of course, since almost every instance of picketing will particularly
affect the homeowner, even if its consequences are at the same time
of sufficient degree to constitute a public nuisance, he would probably
always be a proper plaintiff. Possibly he could gain relief, for while it
109 CHAmE, CAsES ON EQguTy 796 (4th ed. 1958).
110 LEWIS & SPEELLING, Tim LAW oF INJUNCTIONS § 281, at 555 (1926).
111 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 57, 65 Atl. 516, 520 (1906); Elves v. King
County, 49 Wash. 2d 201, 299 P.2d 206 (1956).
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is true that nuisance law looks mainly to direct sensory disturbances,
on occasion purely mental distress independent of direct sensory impact
on the property owner has supported a nuisance suit." 2
Whether the municipal authorities, or the individual homeowner,
or both, could take legal action, there would be difficulties with the
use of injunctive relief, as well as with a suit for damages."3 Generally,
an injunction covers both the defendant to the suit and those who act
as his agents, servants, associates, or confederates." 4 However, "no court
can.., lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it
words its decree.""' 5 Thus, in a situation where a completely unor-
ganized group of protestors motivated by a common grievance pickets
an official's residence, an injunction might not effectively operate.
Moreover, accession by the official to one group might arouse another,
which would not be barred by the already issued injunction. Perhaps
more relevant in terms of political realities is the possibility that the
official would not be politically positioned to bring suit, lest such
action alienate theretofore neutral citizens on whom he is dependent
for support.
The major objection to defining residential picketing in terms of
nuisance law, however, is a more subjective one. This is a constitution-
ally colored activity; its practice is not so blatantly improper as to
evoke bland denunciation. The law of private nuisance is simply not
112 A nuisance may be a mortuary which has a depressing effect, Kundinger v. Bagnasco,
298 Mich. 15, 298 N.W. 386 (1941), a tuberculosis hospital which arouses a fear of con-
tagion, Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 Pa6. 879 (1910), a bawdy house which disturbs
peace of mind, Crawford v. Tyrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891). See generally 35
OR. L. Rnv. 216 (1956).
113 The injured party may recover not only damages for his property losses, but also
for personal inconvenience and discomfort. Thus in Bankston v. Farmers Cooperative Gin,
116 So. 2d 91 (La. Ct. App. 1959), damages were allowed for inconvenience, mental
anguish and suffering resulting from deposit of gin waste, even though damage to prop-
erty was not proved. In Hall v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 259 Minn. 101, 106 N.W.2d
8 (1960), the jury was given discretion in setting damages for personal discomfort and
annoyance, once it was found that odors from the defendant company's factory were
offensive. In regard to the problems the allowance of such damages raises, see text accom-
panying notes 123-24 infra.
Nuisance law also affords the self-help remedy of abatement. However, this would
probably not be feasible when residential picketing occurs. The only way the homeowner
could abate the picketing would be physically to remove the picketers. This would almost
certainly lead to a breach of the peace, at the very least, and one abating a nuisance is
not privileged to create such a disturbance. Schleif v. State, 131 Neb. 875, 270 N.W. 510
(1936).
114 See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R. 386 (1921).
115 Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Developments
in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. Rlv. 994, 1028-31 (1965).
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suited to preclude its exercise. The word "nuisance" itself has been
described as a "sort of legal garbage can,""n and the same commentator
notes that "there has been a deplorable tendency.., to call something
a 'nuisance' and let it go at that."'117 Prohibition of residential picket-
ing merits considered legislative judgment, which may be forthcoming
when an ordinance or statute is passed declaring an activity a public
nuisance, but which is not present in a civil action seeking redress
for a private nuisance.
While the tort law of privacy possibly affords a somewhat more fruit-
ful area of development, it too is an imperfect mode of redress. This
law has developed in response to mentally offensive publications in
the mass communications media." 8 Dean Prosser has suggested, however,
that there are actually four types of invasion of privacy, including
"intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs." 19 He also indicates that intrusions need not be physical to
be actionable as invasions of privacy.120 In light of this view, his follow-
ing statement is particularly apposite:
118 Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. Rav. 899, 410 (1942).
117 Ibid.; cf. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 20 (1930): "'Nuisance' is
not a very happy or adequate concept from which to evolve law for regulating the clash
of conduct in modem industrial relations."
118 The development of this area of the law is traced back to a famous law review
article: Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RaV. 193 (1890). The authors
maintained that because of the invasions of an enterprising and often intrusive press,
there was a need for the law to recognize and protect privacy. Since then, the tort of
invasion of privacy has gained wide currency. See generally Nizer, The Right of Privacy,
39 MicH. L. REv. 526 (1941); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rxv. 383 (1960).
The right of privacy has been referred to as "the right to live one's life in seclusion,
without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In short, it is the right
to be let alone." Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 210, 127 P.2d
577, 579 (1942). An invasion of privacy is an "injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, the
mental anguish and distress caused .... " Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129
F. Supp. 817, 825 (D.D.C. 1955), afi'd, 232 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The most usual form
in which this injury occurs is by publication of a picture of or a story about the plaintiff.
Of course, the invasion of one's privacy by another individual must be distinguished
from governmental intrusion. Thus, the privacy of which the Court speaks in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), and in Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479 (1965), is
distinct from that privacy which is protected by tort law. The observation of the court
in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
is apposite, however: "[It cannot be doubted that the stature and scope of the private law
right have been greatly enhanced by the recent development of its constitutional counter-
part."
119 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 388, 389 (1960).
120 PROSSER, TORTS 883 (3d ed. 1964). The difficulty with Dean Prosser's position, how-
ever, arises out of the decisions he cites to support his statement that intrusions need not
be physical. Id. at 838, n.56-65. Most of them do not rely on the theory of invasion of
privacy, and thus are cognizable as privacy cases only within the generalized meaning of
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It is clear ... that the public figure loses his right of privacy
only to a limited extent. . . The famous motion picture
actress who "vants to be alone" unquestionably has as much
right as anyone else to be free from intrusion into her
home .... 121
If intrusions need not be physical, it might appear that residential
picketing could be an actionable invasion of privacy, as was apparently
held in Molofsky v. Bundy, where the court enjoined the picketers. 122
If the tort law of privacy were applied to residential picketing, how-
ever, the same problems would arise in regard to the injunctive remedy
as exist with nuisance law. If damages were sought from an unorganized
group of picketers the difficulty of reaching them all in one suit might
require a multiplicity of actions as different picketers parade. Invasion
of privacy, moreover, is a dignitary tort allowing damages for mental
suffering. Such damages might be nominal, thereby doing little to
deter future demonstrations. A jury might well feel that a public offi-
cial, whose right to privacy is diminished already, has "asked" for
what has happened, both by virtue of his seeking the public eye and
because it was his actions which engendered the grievance. 23 On the
other hand, there is the possibility of severe damage awards if the
picketers are advocating an unpopular position:
Juries hostile to the aims of an organization in the educational
or political field, unless carefully confined by meticulous in-
structions and judicial supervision, can deliver crushing ver-
dicts that may stifle organized dissent from the views and
policies accepted by the majority.124
Lastly, there is again the possibility that, because the official is depen-
dent on public support, it will not be politically feasible for him to
bring suit.
the term "privacy," rather than within the context of the tort law of privacy. Further-
more, most of the intrusions which these decisions present are indeed physical to some
extent, involving actions such as entrance into the home, Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App.
445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951), or wiretapping, Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 25, 37 S.W.2d 46
(1931).
121 PRossan, TorTas 848 (3d ed. 1964).
122 34 U.S.L. WrK 2582 (U.S. April 16, 1966).
123 Compare Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLUM. L. Rv.
875, 876 (1949).
124 NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 123 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). On
damages for invasion of privacy, see generally Note, Recent Developments in the Right
of Privacy, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 926, 932-36 (1948).
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The Minor Criminal Offense125
Since a disorderly conduct ordinance or the common law breach of
the peace sanction must cover many types of conduct, each speaks
in general language which could easily be interpreted to apply to resi-
dential picketing.12 It is this looseness of language, and the correlative
potential for abuses, which suggest that such an interpretation would
be improper and perhaps unconstitutional.
People v. Levner127 and Flores v. City and County of Denver2 8
illustrate the ambiguity inherent in these minor criminal offenses.
The two cases present quite similar conduct. 129 In sustaining a convic-
tion of disorderly conduct, the Levner court looked to the large number
of people and the consequent potential for danger, and thereby suc-
ceeded in dismissing the appellants' constitutional arguments. 130 Yet
the court was careful to avoid equating all residential picketing with
this offense; confining its concern to the specific facts, it was not "pre-
pared to state that picketing a home is, in and of itself, disorderly
conduct."' 31 The Flores court, however, clearly perceived broader im-
plications. In reversing the picketers' conviction for disturbing the
peace, it not only found insufficient disturbance to warrant the
arrest,132 but also regarded "the noise involved as incidental to a legiti-
125 While breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, and disturbing the peace are tech-
nically distinct offenses, they will be treated interchangeably. These distinctions are not
critical, since they all exhibit the same flaws of concern here-vagueness and the correla-
tive potential for abuses.
126 Many other varieties of conduct have been brought within the ambit of these
offenses. See BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME §§ 715-19 (1946); McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 24.101 (3d ed. 1949).
127 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941).
128 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950).
129 In Levner some 250 persons gathered opposite the apartment of the mayor of New
York City to protest the elimination and curtailment of various work projects. Disregard-
ing a warning from the police, the appellants crossed the street to picket; they were
subsequently arrested. In Flores about 60 people, including the appellants, assembled in
front of the Governor's home, milling around on the sidewalk and lawn, chanting
epithets and carrying placards.
130 30 N.Y.S.2d at 493: "Hundreds of pickets outside of a man's residence transcends
dissemination of information."
131 Ibid.
132 The court reasoned that the ordinance, if read narrowly, could not be invoked
because it was necessary that the peace of others actually be disturbed, and there was no
evidence of this. Even if the ordinance were read broadly, there still was no violation
because the conduct did not constitute a danger to the peace of the community: "There
was no evidence of violence, or of likelihood or threat of violence, or of consternation or
alarm." 122 Colo. 71, 77, 220 P.2d 373, 376 (1950).
The University of Chicago Law Review
mate right .... to appeal to those in authority for redress of grievance
by remonstrance .... ,,133
Although disparate determinations by two different appellate courts
are not unusual, the ambiguity illustrated is disturbing. The loose lan-
guage of ordinances such as those dealt with in these cases opens the
way for both broad initial discretion as to whether an arrest should
be effected, and a wide range in which judicial discretion can operate.
For the basic logistical problem of how residential picketing is to be
effectively prohibited, such ambiguity adds difficulties. In terms
of constitutional doctrine, such vague statutes and ordinances are
viewed with misgivings, as evidenced by the Court's condemnation of
the breach of the peace offense in Edwards v. South Carolina134 and
the disturbing the peace statute in the first Cox decision. 35
Two Minnesota decisions concerning labor residential picketing
illustrate another potential misuse of minor criminal sanctions whereby
significant policy judgments are unwarrantedly obscured. In State v.
Zanker' 36 the Court affirmed the conviction of picketers who had pa-
trolled the home of a non-striking co-employee. About twenty people
gathered, and "there seems to have been quite a bit of excitement."'37
In State v. Perry'38 the union members carried epithet-inscribed ban-
ners. Again spectators gathered, and in this case the wife of the foreman
being picketed turned a hose on the marchers. Affirming a conviction
for disorderly conduct, the court found that the carrying of the banners
caused a breach of the peace.
Both Zanker and Perry may be read as involving not altogether
peaceful picketing. As such the two decisions are unexceptionable, since
disorder or violence on the part of any picketers would justify police
action, 39 or, in the case of labor picketing, an injunction. 140 Trouble-
133 Id. at 77, 220 P.2d at 376.
134 372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963).
135 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965).
136 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930).
137 Id. at 356, 229 N.W. at 311.
138 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936).
139 See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953); Miller v. Gallagher,
176 Misc. 647, 28 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
140 See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941);
Ladies' Garment Workers v. Sherry Mfg. Co., 115 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Gaul, 13 CCH Lab. Cas. 63987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947). Tort damages
may also be recoverable for injuries suffered due to violent picketing. See, e.g., United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
For cases involving labor residential picketing where violence supported an injunction,
see International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, 123 N.J. Eq. 172, 196 At. 474 (1938); Miller v.
Gallagher, 28 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees
Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E.2d 320 (1939); Remington Rand, Inc., v. Crofoot, 289 N.Y.
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some, however, is the court's reliance not only on the appellants'
unruliness but also on the reasoning that the picketing was being con-
ducted at an improper situs,14 ' and that it was mentally distressing to
the householder.142 If the "disorder" lay in these factors, then even
peaceful picketing would constitute disorderly conduct.143
The questionable validity of such a classification is illustrated not
only by judicial hesitancy to make it,144 but also by the fact situations
it would encompass. Such a situation was presented in United Electrical
Workers v. Baldwin.145 Witness also the following description of picket-
ing of Mayor Daley's home in Chicago:
About 100 civil demonstrators file silently into the neigh-
borhood. . . .No one jeers or hoots. No one says a word.
[The neighborhood residents] . .. just stare, as if under
command not to utter a sound-as, indeed, they are. Precinct
workers . . . circulate among them, shushing any talkers.
The marchers ... slowly walk around the Mayor's block,
equally silent. Their cadres . . . move up and down the
lines whispering commands: "No talking, two-by-two, stay on
the sidewalk, men on the outside.' 46
If a disorderly conduct or breach of the peace charge is leveled in
such circumstances, it can only be because residential picketing per se
is being equated with the offense. Such a policy judgment is more
properly made in clear terms, rather than from behind the veil of
Supp. 1025 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. 449, 30 Ad. 261 (1894);
Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595, 25 Ad. 492 (1893).
141 The court in Perry felt that the "defendants were endeavoring to carry into the
home and domestic life of Gustafson an industrial controversy which should have been
left elsewhere." 196 Minn. at 482, 265 N.W. at 302.
142 The court in Zanker observed: "[The picketers] disregarded her right to be un-
disturbed. They resorted to offensive means. Their conduct necessarily carried some
degree of humiliation and insult; it naturally tended to provoke resentment, not only on
the part of Norma Christensen and her family, but also among the neighbors." 179
Minn. at 356-57, 229 N.W. at 311-12.
143 This equation was apparently made in State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903
(1939). After Dahl, a chauffeur and general houseman, was fired, his union authorized
picketing of his former employer's residence. The defendant, one of the picketers, was
convicted of disorderly conduct. The court affirmed, viewing the home as "a sanctuary of
the individual." Id. at 336, 285 N.W. at 905. In view of Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468 (1937), in which a union was allowed to picket the residence-business of Senn, the
Cooper decision is of dubious validity.
144 See, e.g., United Electrical Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946);
People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1941). But see State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W.
903 (1939).
145 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
146 Wille, Mayor Daley Meets the Movement, The Nation, August 30, 1965, p. 92. See
note 152 infra.
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a minor criminal charge: 147 since the activity does have constitutional
overtones, in that the rights of speech, assembly, and petition are being
exercised, its proscription requires careful consideration. The lower
courts' traditional reluctance to pass on constitutional questions148
147 Cf. CHAFEE, FRE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1948 ed.). The possibility
of abuse of police and judicial discretion is one of the most serious indictments which may
be leveled against loose disorderly conduct ordinances. An example of the problems is
offered by those ordinances embodying language to the effect that a refusal to obey an
order of a police officer to move on or disperse constitutes a violation of the law. See,
e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722(3). See also Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F. Supp. 737, 748 (1962);
City of Tacoma v. Roe, 190 Wash. 444, 68 P.2d 1028 (1937). See generally 65 A.L.R.2d
1152 (1959). Such a provision might allow an officer to order residential picketers to
move on, thus allowing their practice, in effect, to be regulated by his whim. Cf. Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 95 (1965). Contra, Chariton v. City of Fitz-
simmons, 87 Iowa 226, 54 N.W. 146 (1893); People ex rel Frank v. Keeper of State Re-
formatory, 38 Misc. 283, 77 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1902), aff'd People ex rel Frank v.
Davis, 80 App. Div. 448, 80 N.Y. Supp. 872 (1903), to the effect that an order to move on
cannot be made at the mere whim of the officer, but must be supported by the acts which
inspired the order.
Moreover, since the courts often accept the officer's interpretation of the necessities for
police action, conviction following a refusal to move on may well stand. As to the
court's largely indiscriminate acceptance of officer's actions, see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965) (Black, J., concurring); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); State v. Taylor,
38 N.J. Super. 6, 24-25, 30, 118 A.2d 36, 46, 48 (App. Div. 1955); People v. Galpern, 259
N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572 (1932). Contra, People v. Kieran, 6 Misc. 2d 245, 263, 26 N.Y.S.2d
291, 306 (Nassau County Ct. 1940); People v. Friedman, 6 Misc. 2d 271, 14 N.Y.S.2d 389,
392 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1939). Epitomizing the problem is People v. Galpern, 59 N.Y. 279,
181 N.E. 572 (1932), which is often approvingly cited. The defendant, a lawyer, had
stopped on the street to talk briefly with some friends. Before they separated an officer
approached and told them to move on; the defendant refused and was arrested and
convicted of disorderly conduct. The court affirmed, even though it recognized that
friends may stop on the sidewalk for a short conversation, and that in doing so they are
not creating disorder or offending anyone or obstructing free passage. Even though such
an order is unnecessary and ill-advised, it is not unauthorized. A refusal to obey is justi-
fiable only where the circumstances show conclusively that the officer's order was "purely
arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public order." Id. at
284-85, 181 N.E. at 574. Such arbitrariness would appear to be very difficult to show,
at least to the Galpern court, since it said: "The courts cannot weigh opposing considera-
tions as to the wisdom of the police officer's directions when a police officer. is called
upon to decide whether the time has come in which some directions are called for." Id.
at 285, 181 N.E. at 574.
It is true that in Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963), the Court, in reversing the
conviction of Negro youths who had refused an officer's order to leave a whites-only
basketball court said: "One cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an
officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution." Id. at 291-92. However, the
command was violative in Wright because the petitioners had a right to use the basket-
ball court. It remains to be determined whether residential picketers are pursuing a
constitutional right. Certainly, if they are not, there are more suitable ways to establish
this than by the affirmance of a disorderly conduct conviction for a refusal to move on-
viz., legislative determination.
148 See People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1941); Barrett, Avoidance
of Judicial Decision Upon Constitutional Ground When Decision Can Be Based Upon
Other Ground, 28 ORE. L. REv. 201 (1949).
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may lead them to emphasize the severity of disorder, thereby avoiding
treatment of residential picketing as a distinct event. 149 Moreover, even
if close analysis may reveal that a policy judgment is sometimes being
made-albeit sub silentio-when residential picketers are convicted
of disorderly conduct, the use of such a sanction obscures this judg-
ment.150 The potential picketer is thus left in doubt as to whether
prior dispositions turned on the question of actual disorder, dr on the
event of the picketing itself.151
It is perhaps unreasonable, however, to suppose that residential
picketing will always be peaceful. If the picketers are orderly, then
police action may be inspired by the presence of a hostile audience,152
149 This is perhaps a proper framework in which to reconcile Levner, which empha-
sized the disorder and thus dismissed the constitutional arguments, with Flores, which
minimized the unruliness and turned to the constitutional issues.
150 Cf., Note, Non-Labor Picketing, 41 COLUm. L. Rav. 89, 94 (1941).
151 Cf., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), involving vague penal statutes. See generally Amsterdam,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
152 Such a situation is illustrated in City of Chicago v. Gant, Chicago Munic. Ct.
No. 585,798 (1965), an unreported decision. See discussion of this case in Kamin, Picketing
177-82, 231-36. On August 1-5, 1965, a group picketed Mayor Daley's home in Chicago
to protest the rehiring of the superintendent of schools. See note 3 supra. Despite the
peacefulness of the picketers, they were ordered to disperse because of the spectators'
hostile reaction. The picketers refused and some of them were arrested. (This occurred
two nights prior to the peaceful situation depicted in the Wille article, supra note 146.)
They were subsequently convicted of disorderly conduct. Chicago Daily News, Nov. 13,
1965, p. 6, col. 8, and Nov. 12, 1965, p. 17, cols. 2-5. The following is a portion of the tran-
script of the trial, presenting a part of the dialogue between the defense attorney and a
police officer at the scene:
Q. At 35th and Lowe, at the time of Commander Pierson's statement that con-
ditions were riotous, what, if anything, were the marchers doing?
A. They were standing there on the sidewalk.
Q. Were they singing?
A. Not at that time.
Q. Were they chanting?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Were they noisy?
A. No, ma am.
Q. Were they shouting?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Were they throwing rocks?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Were they throwing eggs?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. ... Were the spectators shouting?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Were they noisey? (sic).
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. ... Were they throwing eggs?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Were they throwing rocks?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Were they shouting epithets such as, "Go home, nigger."
A. They were shouting. I couldn't honestly say they were shouting that.
Record, pp. 135-37, City of Chicago v. Gant, Chicago Munic. Ct. No. 585,798 (1965).
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for the typical interpretation of disorderly conduct ordinances is that
"conduct is disorderly, in the ordinary sense, when it is of such nature
as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness the same
and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment thereby."'153
A steadily growing line of decisions, however, indicates that peaceful
picketers should not be arrested for disorderly conduct or breach of
the peace on the basis of a hostile audience's reaction. 54 In the first
Cox decision, 155 the Court reversed Cox's conviction for disturbing the
peace, reading the evidence as showing no indication of threatened
violence by the spectators who had gathered at the demonstration
scene. Even conceding, however, that the presence of police might be
necessary because of the unpopularity of the marchers' activity, "consti-
tutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility as to their
assertion or exercise."'156 Thus, even though the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not "afford the same kind of freedom" to non-labor
picketing as they do to pure speech, 157 non-labor picketing is of sufficient
constitutional stature as to preclude its abridgement solely on the basis
of a hostile audience reaction.5 8
The Administrative Approach-Licensing
Licensing of speech and speech-associated activities has long been
condemned as a form of prior restraint. 159 Nonetheless, at least one
153 State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 357, 229 N.W. 311, 312 (1936).
154 The leading decision is Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). Terminiello
had delivered an anti-Semitic speech in a private hail. Outside, an angry crowd gathered.
Terminiello was arrested and convicted for disorderly conduct. The Court reversed this
conviction on the basis of an improper jury instruction, but it went on to characterize
his actions as protected speech. See generally Note, 49 CoLuM. L. REv. 1118 (1949); Note,
Verbal Acts and Ideas: The Common Sense of Free Speech, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 328 (1949).
In Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1950), the Court, while mindful that the presence
of a hostile audience cannot silence a speaker, upheld a disorderly conduct conviction
because the "speaker [passed] the bounds of argument or persuasion and [had undertaken]
incitement to riot." Id. at 321.
155 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
156 Id. at 551, citing Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963).
157 See quotation accompanying note 34 supra.
158 See also Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 296
(1941) (involving labor picketing); Allen v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 888 (D.C. Ct. App.
1963). The Terminiello rationale has been applied to other non-pure speech situations as
well. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S.
284 (1963); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1963).
Just as a hostile audience will not justify the arrest of peaceful demonstrators, the
courts cannot enjoin persons from engaging in lawful activities on the sole ground that
others may react to the activities unlawfully and violently. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958); CORE v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1963). Contra, United States v. U.S.
Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
159 See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNraap. PRaoB.
648, 660-69 (1955).
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commentator on the public forum has suggested that "the judg-
ments of time, place, and manner required must be so linked to
the factual situation as to make detailed legislative regulation a
clumsy, inflexible device."'160 Thus, he proposes licensing as a tenable
system for control of the use of the streets. However, a licensing system
is unnecessary to deal with residential picketing. Since use of the resi-
dential situs is uniformly improper, except where the office is in the
home,161 no occasion would arise for the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion. While considerations of time, place, and manner may be so
complex as to make the traditional balancing formula an awkward
approach to the public forum, these considerations are not trouble-
some when residential picketing is analyzed. The number of picketers,
the time of day, the intensity of traffic, and other variables of time and
manner do not alter the character of the private residence as unsuitable
for protest activity.
Legislative Determination-A Narrowly Drawn Statute
If residential picketing is to be prohibited, it is a narrowly drawn
statute which should be utilized to achieve this end. Even in Edwards
v. South Carolina, where the Court was clearly impressed with the dem-
onstration as "an exercise of... basic constitutional rights,"'1 2 it might
have taken a different view had there been the "evenhanded application
of a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative
judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed."' 163
The second Cox decision, as well, reveals the strong deference accorded
such a law. The legislative determination there gave prohibition of
courthouse picketing an imprimatur of constitutionality it might not
otherwise have had.
Several state legislatures have enacted statutes relating to residential
picketing. Most of these are directed towards labor activity and declare
it to be an unfair labor practice subject to the courts' or state em-
ployment relations boards' injunctive powers. 64 One state, Hawaii,
160 Kalven, The Public Forum 28-29.
161 See note 78 supra.
162 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
163 Id. at 236. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
164 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-6(2)(b) (1963); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. 31-120
(1960); FLA. STAT. ANN., § 447.09(11) (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-809(12) (1949);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(10.5) (1960); NEB. REv. STAT. 28-812(6) (1965); S.D. CODE § 17.1107
(Supp. 1960) (no picketing of homes on agricultural premises); UTAH CODE ANN 34-1 8(2)(a)
(1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. 111.06(2)(a) (1957).
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) (1965), is also applicable, as
ruled in Meat Cutters, Local 150-F, United Mechanics' Union (American Photocopy Equip-
ment Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 58 L.R.R.M. 1413 (1965)..Residential picketing may, how-
ever, be enjoined by the states where it is violent, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
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makes residential picketing in any context a criminal offense.165 Other
states have banned picketing of the homes of judges, jurors, witnesses,
or court officers.166 Arizona, on the other hand, sanctions labor resi-
dential picketing.1 67 While the courts have seldom confronted such
statutory provisions, the Supreme Court has on at least three occasions
given passing approval to a labor statute declaring such picketing an
unfair labor practice. 6 8
In prohibiting non-labor residential picketing, the state or munic-
ipality would be exercising its well recognized powers to regulate the
use of the streets and other public places. 6 9 Usually, when an ordinance
or statute implementing those powers has been struck down as uncon-
stitutional, the decision has turned on the excessive breadth of the
ordinance 70 or on the issue of prior restraint. 17' Neither problem
tions Ed., 351 U.S. 266, 272 (1956), or even peaceful, State v. Macelwane, 116 Ohio App.
183, 195, 187 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1961).
165 HAWAU Rxv. LAws § 300-1,2,3 (1955) Picketing of Residence or Dwelling Place.
300-1. Declarations of legislature. It is hereby declared that the protection and
preservation of the home is the keystone of democratic government; that the
public health and welfare and good order of the community require that mem-
bers of the community enjoy in their homes a feeling of well-being, tranquility,
and privacy, and when absent from their homes carry with them the sense of
security inherent in the assurance that they may return to the enjoyment of their
homes; that the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwelling places
causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants; that such practice has
as its object the harassing of such occupants and, without resort to such practice,
full opportunity exists, and under the terms and provisions of this chapter will
continue to exist, for the exercise of freedom of speech and other constitutional
rights; and that the provisions hereinafter enacted are necessary to the public
interest, to avoid the detrimental results herein set forth....
300-2. Picketing of residence or dwelling prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any
person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling place
of any individual. Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit (a) the picketing
in any lawful manner, during a labor dispute, of the place of employment
involved in such labor disputes; or (b) the holding of a meeting or assembly on
any premises used for the discussion of subjects of general public interest....
300-3. Penalty. Any Person violating section 300-2 shall be fined not more than
$200 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both....
166 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 14:101 (Gum. Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4327
(1963).
167 ARuz. REv. STAT. § 12-1808 B.2. (1956):
B. The preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order ... shall not pro-
hibit any person from:
2. Attending at or near a house or place where any person resides or works, or
carries on business, or happens to be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or
communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or
to abstain from working.
168 UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Ed., 351 U.S. 266, 274 (1956); Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953); Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Ed., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).
169 For partial listing see 37 NmB. L. Rlv. 479 (1958).
170 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
171 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945);
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would be present here. Prohibition could take the form suggested by
Professor Emerson, writing of the possibilty of regulation aimed at
protecting homeowners' privacy:
The restriction can be couched in terms of a limitation on
. .. geographical area .... or the allocation of space in the
public park system. No element of prohibition or regulation
of the content of the communication is involved. 7 2
The Hawaii statute, in fact, affords an excellent model from which
to work.
Of course, even a legislative solution will not remedy all the prob-
lems which residential picketing raises. In terms of form, the statute
would have to include a caveat allowing picketing of homes in which
the office is located. 7 3 Here the need for access to the official would
probably override the disruptive factors of the activity. As for inter-
pretation of the statute, to fall within the ambit of the offense a specific
home would have to be the target of the protest, lest general neighbor-
hood marches be unwarrantedly halted. This may not always be easily
discernible. Professor Kamin, in his work on residential picketing, notes
that after several days of protests during which it was clear that the
home of Chicago's Mayor Daley was the target of the marches, the
rhetoric of the demonstrators changed to a protest against the segrega-
tion of the entire neighborhood within which they were parading.7 4
A variation of this problem is suggested by the same series of dem-
onstrations. The marchers did not remain before the mayor's home, but
paraded around the block on which he lived. Whether a march whose
perimeters enclosed four square blocks, instead of one, could be
considered as directed against a target residence would depend upon
factual determinations, such as the nature of the grievance and the
statements of the group. At some point, it would seem clear, the pick-
eting, even if denouncing a specific individual, would not fall within
the sphere of the proposed statute.
Another problem in prohibiting all non-labor residential picketing
exists because much of the argument in favor of the practice is tempered
by the official's public character, and the consequent ease of access to
the communications media. However, the target of picketers might be a
relatively unknown individual. Probably the best example of this, and
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). See
generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONThMP. PROB. 649, 664-67
(1955).
172 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 927
(1963).
173 See note 78 supra.
174 Kamin, Picketing 181.
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one whose home is frequently beset by residential picketers, is the
slumlord, 75 who often actively seeks anonymity. While exposure of
such lesser-known people may be welcome, and often efficacious, 176
residential picketing remains a questionable tactic. At least in the case
of unwarranted housing practices, protests directed to the proper munic-
ipal agencies, 177 and enforcement and improvement of present hous-
ing codes, appear to be the proper solutions. True, there will still be
some intra-party disputes which cannot be resolved by resort to such
agencies and legislation. But the merits of residential picketing, when
measured against its drawbacks, do not commend this practice as the
means to publicize otherwise obscure conflicts.
CONCLUSION
Residential picketing is a regrettable tactic in the armament of
protesters. Nevertheless, it is a constitutionally colored activity-it
partakes of the rights of speech, assembly, and petition. This charac-
terization, plus the absence of precedents which are dispositive, re-
quires a careful analysis of the feasibility of proscription.
The practice of residential picketing exerts "injuries" upon the home-
owner-public official, making of him and his family a captive audience
and intruding into the enjoyment and privacy of their home. In weighing
the benefits of the residential situs against the detriments, the argument
for prohibition of residential picketing is strongest, since only by
such prohibition can the homeowner's interests be protected. Un-
deniably, prohibition of residential picketing would work to the detri-
ment of the picketer: he would lose a forum which affords him econ-
omy, publicity, and effectiveness. These benefits are not completely lost;
they can be largely approximated elsewhere. Thus prohibition, its
* detriments mitigated by the availability of other demonstration sites,
offers the most tenable compromise.
Nuisance law, the tort law of privacy, and minor criminal sanctions
such as those for disorderly conduct are not suited to effect this prohi-
bition. A narrowly drawn statute is necessary. It would evince the con-
sidered legislative judgment necessary to resolve the issues which resi-
dential picketing raises, while at the same time it would clearly
forewarn the potential picketer.
175 See Chicago Sun-Times, March 14, 1966, p. 28, cols. 1-3; Chicago Sun-Times, May
9, 1966, p. 10, cols. 2-3; Chicago Daily News, Sept. 12, 1966, p. 9, cols. 1-2.
176 See SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 830 (1964).
177 Cf. Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140
(Sup. Ct. 1964); People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y.S. 629 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 266
N.Y. 565, 195 N.E. 202 (1934).
